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1. Introduction
How is it possible for Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711–1776) to be both 
withering skeptic and constructive theorist? I recommend an answer like the Pyrrhonian 
answer to the question how it is possible to suspend all judgment yet engage in active 
daily life. Sextus Empiricus distinguishes two kinds of assent: one suspended across the 
board and one involved with daily living. The first—active endorsement—is an act of 
will based on appreciation of reasons; the second—passive acquiescence—is a causal 
effect of appearances. I suggest that Hume makes the same distinction, only he extends 
the sort of assent involved in the Pyrrhonian’s daily life to theoretical matters as well.1 He 
is a skeptic both in finding no reason to grant the one sort of assent and in being subject 
to the other. 
Understanding my suggested Hume interpretation requires understanding the 
Pyrrhonian distinction in Michael Frede’s way, which I will explain. To bring out the 
relevant features of Frede’s version, I defend it against the rival version of Myles 
Burnyeat. Next, I suggest that Hume’s version of the distinction is that between belief as 
an act “of the cogitative part of our natures” and as an act of the “sensitive” part (Treatise 
1 My reading follows Popkin (1966) (on Popkin on the crucial influence of Pyrrhonism on modern 
philosophy in general, see Maia Neto’s chapter in this volume). See also Baxter (2006; 2008: ch. 1; 2009a; 
2009b). Note that Hume does not follow the Pyrrhonians in their centrally important concern with 
tranquility. For a detailed discussion of Hume’s familiarity with Sextus’s works, see Fosl (1998). 
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[T] 1.4.1.8).2 Hume’s version can be fleshed out in the way I suggest by regarding it, as 
Dugald Stewart did, to be derived from a lengthy discussion of Ralph Cudworth’s. I then 
summarize how Treatise 1.4.1, “Scepticism with regard to reason,” shows both that active 
endorsement is never merited and that passive aquiescence cannot be avoided.  
 Julia Annas hints at an account like the one I give, but does not develop it and 
ends up reading Hume as a dogmatist (Annas 2000: 276, 279). Instead, I recommend 
reading Hume as finding no sufficiently good reason for active endorsement of any view 
while yet yielding passive acquiescence in even some theoretical matters. In theorizing 
thus concerning the science of man, Hume remains just as much a skeptic as Sextus does 
in daily life, such as when avoiding precipices or engaging in religious devotions. 
 
2. Pyrrhonian Kinds of Assent 
The characterization of Pyrrhonism I will give depends heavily on the work of Michael 
Frede (1997a; 1997b) on kinds of assent. Frede’s interpretation is a minority view; the 
majority view follows the interpretation of Myles Burnyeat (1997a). It will help in 
understanding Frede’s difficult view to contrast it with Burnyeat’s. In explaining the key 
difference between them, as I understand it, I’ll focus on Sextus’s Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism. Both Frede and Burnyeat take Sextus to have an answer to the traditional 
challenge to the skeptic, one famously reiterated by Hume in his Enquiry concerning 
Human Understanding (EHU 12.23).3 Here is the challenge: if you are utterly passive, 
then you will quickly perish, but if you act to preserve your life, then you must believe 
something, for all action requires some belief. For instance, you would not eat in 
response to hunger, if you did not believe that eating would relieve your hunger. This 
                                                            
2 I cite Hume’s Treatise by book, part, section, and paragraph. I use the text in Hume (2007). 
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challenge is generally posed by those who assume that the Pyrrhonian eschews any kind 
of assent. That assumption is attacked in different ways by both Frede and Burnyeat. 
Their attacks rely on passages from Sextus such as these: 
 
When we say that Sceptics do not hold beliefs, we do not take ‘belief’ in the sense 
in which some say, quite generally, that belief is acquiescing in something; for 
Sceptics assent to the feelings forced upon them by appearances. … Rather, we 
say that they do not hold beliefs in the sense in which some say that belief is 
assent to some unclear object of investigation in the sciences; for Pyrrhonists do 
not assent to anything unclear. (PH I 13)4 
 
But the main point is this: in uttering these phrases they say what is apparent to 
themselves and report their own feelings without holding opinions, affirming 
nothing about external objects. (PH I 15) 
 
As we said before, we do not overturn anything which leads us, without our 
willing it, to assent in accordance with a passive appearance. (PH I 19) 
 
Remember too that we say we neither posit nor reject anything which is said 
dogmatically about what is unclear; for we do yield to things which passively 
move us and lead us necessarily to assent. (PH I 193) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 I cite Hume’s Enquiry by section and paragraph. I use the text in Hume (2000). 
4 I follow the translation by Annas and Barnes in Sextus Empiricus (2000). 
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For his interpretation, Frede distinguishes two kinds of assent. In one way, you do not 
assent to the view that eating relieves hunger, but in another way you do. Burnyeat does 
not distinguish two kinds of assent, but rather distinguishes two classes of proposition 
liable to assent. A rough way to make the distinction is to say that one class consists of 
propositions beginning with “It appears to me now that …,”5 where this phrase is used in 
the course of stating that something is appearing to you and describing how it appears. 
The other class consists of all the other propositions. Thus the Pyrrhonian who acts to 
relieve his hunger assents to the proposition “It appears to me now that eating relieves 
hunger” understood in this way, and not to the proposition “Eating relieves hunger.” In 
making their respective distinctions, both Frede and Burnyeat hold that there are 
assentings of a sort that is necessary to survival, and assentings of a sort that is not 
necessary to survival. It is this latter sort of assenting that is at issue in theoretical 
discussions about unclear matters and that the Pyrrhonian avoids. Thus one can be a 
Pyrrhonian without perishing. 
Four considerations incline me against Burnyeat’s view. Appreciating them helps 
one appreciate the nuances of Frede’s interpretation. 
It seems to me, first, that assent to “It appears to me now that eating relieves 
hunger,” used to state that one is being appeared to and to describe how, is not sufficient 
to motivate eating when one is hungry. It can only motivate eating if it leads to some kind 
of assent to “Eating relieves hunger.” One is motivated, generally, not by realizing how 
the world appears to one, but by taking some sort of stand on how the world is. So 
Burnyeat’s proposal does not solve the problem with survival. Perhaps Burnyeat need not 
say that assent to “It appears to me now that eating relieves hunger” motivates eating. 
                                                            
5 Or, perhaps better, propositions perspicuously paraphrased by propositions beginning with ‘It appears to 
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Rather, the appearance that prompts that report also directly motivates eating.6 However, 
for the direct motivation to happen, the content of the appearance must be “Eating 
relieves hunger.” Being moved by this appearance will be just like the kind of assent 
necessary for survival that Frede defends. So this defense of Burnyeat would be a 
concession to his opponent. 
It seems to me, second, that the Burnyeat interpretation is not forced by the text. 
True, Sextus says that the skeptics will only say “what is apparent to themselves, and 
report their own feelings, affirming nothing about external objects.” But I think that often 
the phrase “It appears that…” is not used to state and describe, but rather is used to 
qualify one’s assent to the proposition in its scope. If I say, “It appears to me now that 
eating relieves hunger,” I am assenting to “Eating relieves hunger” with reservations. 
Perhaps I suspect that I have not established its truth conclusively. Or, more to the point, 
perhaps I am just reporting the view which is striking me now—that eating relieves 
hunger—without making any commitments to there being any good reason to hold that 
view. So, when skeptics say what is apparent to themselves, they need not be 
unreservedly endorsing that they are appeared to a certain way; they may rather with 
maximum reservation be venting the view that things are that way (PH I 13, 15).7 Thus 
there is a natural alternative to Burnyeat’s way of interpreting Sextus’s frequent appeals 
to how things appear. 
This alternative is not exactly what Frede terms the “epistemic sense” of 
‘appears’, if in that sense ‘it appears to me’ is synonymous with ‘I think’ or ‘I believe’. 
These locutions can sometimes express assent with reservations, but do not always 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
me now that . . .’ 
6 I’m grateful to Lionel Shapiro for this suggestion. 
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express that. I am reluctant to use the word ‘belief’ to characterize assent with 
reservations as I elucidate it. In his earlier paper, Frede suggests that the skeptic has 
beliefs, though it becomes apparent that Frede is using an elastic sense of ‘belief’ that 
could include even an impression we don’t object to (Frede 1997a: 10, 21–22). I think 
this way of putting things went too far and was corrected in his later paper. 
It seems to me, third, that Frede’s view makes better sense than Burnyeat’s of 
Sextus’s claims that the skeptical phrases “cancel” themselves (PH I 14–15, 206). Phrases 
such as “In no way more” or “No more this than that” mean that anything and its 
negation are equally convincing, and so anything is unconvincing—it leaves the 
judgment suspended. As Sextus says, “Everything is no more so than not so.” This 
utterance applies to itself, and so the skeptics make clear that they suspend judgment 
even concerning their own utterances. This is the sense in which the phrases “cancel” 
themselves. Each phrase says in part that it itself is unconvincing. However, if skeptical 
phrases implicitly have the content that Burnyeat would think they do, then there would 
be no self-cancelling. The sentence “It appears to me now that everything is equally 
convincing and unconvincing,” if true, does not entail that everything is unconvincing. So 
it does not entail that it itself is unconvincing. So it does not cancel itself. 
In a footnote, Burnyeat notices a related problem with self-cancelling. He says 
that Sextus’s self-cancelling propositions have to make a truth claim to be self-cancelling, 
whereas, according to Burnyeat elsewhere, reports of appearances make no truth claim 
(1997: 30–31).8 Therefore, one infers, Sextus’s self-cancelling phrases cannot be reports 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
7 Cf. Sellars (1956: sec. 16). Wittgenstein (1958: 92) says: “Don’t regard a hesitant assertion as an assertion 
of hesitancy.” 
8 Barnes (1997: 65 n. 21) disagrees. Burnyeat uses the term ‘self-refuting’ instead of ‘self-cancelling’. 
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of appearances interpreted Burnyeat’s way. However, Burnyeat sees it as a problem for 
Sextus, not for his own interpretation (Burnyeat 1997a: 54 n. 52). 
Fourth, while both interpretations grant some kind of assent to what is apparent, 
Frede’s makes better sense of the skeptic’s practice of continuing to investigate whether 
what is apparent is real. If, say, “Honey sweetens” is what is apparent, then it makes 
sense to investigate whether “Honey sweetens” is really true (PH I 19). However, if “It 
appears to me now that honey sweetens” is what is apparent, understood the way 
Burnyeat intends, then there is nothing to investigate beyond the fact that you are 
appeared to in that way. 
Burnyeat might reply that what one investigates is whether the state or impression 
avowed when one says “It appears to me now that honey sweetens” conforms to reality. 
However, this response acknowledges my point. For a state to conform to reality is for 
the proposition it contains to be true. So the object of investigation is whether “Honey 
sweetens” is true, not whether “It appears to me now that honey sweetens” is true. 
Thus, I incline to Frede’s interpretation of Sextus. In any event, Frede’s approach 
to Sextus provides an extremely fruitful way of resolving a perennial problem in Hume 
interpretation—how to reconcile Hume the skeptic with Hume the scientist of Man—in a 
way that does justice both to the power of Hume’s skeptical arguments and to the 
scientific aspirations of Hume’s psychological theory. So I recommend assuming that 
Frede has Sextus right, for the purpose of understanding Hume. 
 Sextus distinguishes two kinds of assent. Here I will give my own understanding 
of the distinction rather than try accurately to represent Frede’s. Call the two kinds of 
assent ‘active endorsement’ and ‘passive acquiescence’. The first is to actively endorse a 
view as true for a reason that one appreciates to be sufficiently good. The second is to 
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passively acquiesce in a view forced upon one by appearances. ‘View’ can mean the 
mental state one has in entertaining a proposition that is a candidate for being assented to, 
but I mean the proposition itself.9  
 An example of active endorsement might be the firm conviction of a 
mathematician in the result of a proof on which he has labored long and carefully and 
which has received the approbation of his peers. Another might be the unshakeable 
conviction of a religious zealot who considers his faith’s scriptures to be self-justifying. 
These examples are not conclusively examples. Active endorsement will, for Hume, turn 
out to be a fiction that we and his opponents often believe in, but without good reason. In 
any event, the examples are helpful at this stage in seeing what the contrast with passive 
acquiescence is supposed to be. Because of the self-conscious attempt to reason as one 
ought to, active endorsement has greater pretensions than everyday belief. Its natural 
home, if it has any, would be enterprises in which one investigates unclear matters 
beyond the mundane concerns of daily life. Crucially, belief is supposed to be chosen—
chosen because one understands that it is what one ought to believe. In this sense it is 
called active. 
Passive acquiescence, on the other hand, has no more pretension than everyday 
belief, and sometimes less. In passively acquiescing one goes along with the view that 
strikes one without making any decision one way or the other about its legitimacy. For 
example, if a crowd stampedes by shouting, “The dam has broken!” you might well run 
along without stopping to consider whether or not this could be true. Circumstances just 
sweep you into acting as if the view that the dam has broken were indeed true (cf. 
Thurber 1942: 22). Passive acquiescence is acting as if a belief were true without 
                                                            
9 ‘Belief’ encompasses a similar ambiguity between mental state and its propositional content. 
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deciding that it is. In this respect, it is like conjecture, pretense, supposition, and taking as 
a working hypothesis. When a two year old pretends that a countertop is a sink, going 
through the motions of washing her hands and declaring, “This is a real sink,” no one, 
least of all her, is fooled. She has not decided that what she says is true, but acts as if it is 
true for all that. So do people taking the other attitudes I’ve listed. A member of a 
committee, who uncharitably suspects a fellow member of being disingenuous, might 
take as a working hypothesis that the other member is acting in good faith. The result 
might predictably be greater peace of mind for hypothesizer and a better outcome for the 
committee. Pursuing these practical benefits is not the same as deciding in favor of the 
truth of the hypothesis. Similarly, passive acquiescence in a view is a matter of acting as 
if the view is true. However, there is a major difference from the attitudes I just 
mentioned. They are chosen. Passive acquiescence, on the other hand, is not the result of 
willing. It is a causal effect of how things strike one. In this sense it is passive. 
The best examples of passive acquiescence would be the “beliefs” of animals—
for instance, those of the little pig admired by Pyrrho (DL IX 68, 481). Animal beliefs are 
beliefs only in an analogous sense, not being governed in any way by normative 
considerations. Instead, they are brought about by some sort of instinctual response to 
circumstances. 
 It is with respect to active endorsement that a Pyrrhonian suspends judgment. He 
finds that for any argument for any conclusion, he is able to find an apparently equally 
good argument for a conflicting conclusion. This balancing of arguments leaves him 
disinclined to either side, resulting in a suspense of judgment, i.e., no active endorsement 
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either way.10 After all, active endorsement is meant to be the kind of assent that results 
from reasoning as you ought to in the recognition that you are reasoning as you ought to. 
One cannot arrive at this kind of assent when one has an equally good reason to endorse 
something conflicting.  
 This method of balancing conflicting arguments is central to the Pyrrhonian 
enterprise, even when Pyrrhonians take pains to lay out all-purpose arguments against 
any conclusion. For instance, take the argument that (i) nothing should be believed 
without a reason, and (ii) any conclusion is believed either for no reason, or a circular 
reason (which is no reason), or a vicious infinite regress of reasons (which is no reason) 
(cf. PH I 166, 168, 169). In giving such an “all-purpose” argument, the Pyrrhonist would 
be taking for granted that there would be some consideration in favor of the other side, 
which needed to be counterbalanced. The result is suspense of active endorsement.11 
 Generally, it is investigations into unclear matters, such as those investigated in 
philosophy, science, mathematics, and religion, in which one would seek to actively 
endorse a view. In such investigations one is self-reflectively trying to find good reasons 
for granting assent. In daily life, when one is for the most part just reacting for practical 
purposes to the way things appear, one does not strive to meet the high standards of 
active endorsement. 
 As the Pyrrhonian continues to investigate, his ability to balance every argument 
with something conflicting has its effect on him. It begins to appear as if no proposition 
deserves active assent. As Sextus puts it, “Thus what is said is this: ‘All of the unclear 
                                                            
10 I disagree with Burnyeat’s claim that this process could happen only if the skeptic comes to the belief 
that “contrary claims are equal” (Burnyeat 1997a: 56) The skeptic need at most acquiesce in this 
appearance, and perhaps, as Barnes urges, the suspense of judgment “simply happens to us” (Barnes 1997: 
58–59). 
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matters investigated in dogmatic fashion which I have inspected appear to me 
inapprehensible’” (PH I 200). He, of course, does not actively endorse this view, but it 
governs his actions nonetheless. Now, it seems natural to say that he passively acquiesces 
in this view. However, it seems to me that the view concerns a theoretical matter about 
something that is not obvious, even if giving an appearance. Note that not all appearances 
are sensory appearances (Frede 1973: 809). For example, Sextus says that the 
Pyrrhonians accept the appearance “that piety is good and impiety bad” (PH I 23). Thus, 
the door seems opened to Hume’s extension of passive acquiescence into theoretical 
matters beyond active daily life (Popkin 1966: 95; Norton 1982: 268 n. 48).12 The 
skeptic’s view seems forced on him by appearances. Hume develops and extends this 
notion of views forced by appearances. 
 
3. Humean Kinds of Assent 
Hume’s account echoes the Pyrrhonian’s distinction between two kinds of assent and the 
appeal to appearances forcing views on one. Hume (T 1.4.1.8) explicitly makes the 
distinction between two kinds of assent: belief as an act of the “cogitative part of our 
natures” or as a “simple act of the thought” versus “belief as an act of the sensitive … 
part of our natures.” 
 It is not immediately apparent that Hume’s distinction maps onto active 
endorsement and passive acquiescence in the way I’m suggesting. However, evidence is 
provided by historical context. Dugald Stewart (2005: 219) points the way, noting that 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
11 For a similar approach to “Agrippa’s Trilemma,” see Williams (1988: 573–583), though Williams sees 
the results of the modes of Agrippa as denials of specifically epistemological theses that would be held by a 
dogmatist, whereas I see them as in conflict with any conclusion assented to for a reason. 
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the distinction in Hume is familiar from the work of Ralph Cudworth. Cudworth spends 
much time developing the distinction: 
 
Wherefore it is evident from what we have declared, that there are two kinds of 
Perceptive Cogitations in our Soul: the one Passive, when the Soul perceives by 
suffering from its Body, and the Objects without; the other Active, when it 
perceives by its exerting its own Native Vigor from within it self. (1731: 4.1.7)13 
 
Cudworth explicitly connects the first with appearance, when he observes that “the 
Nature of Sense consists in nothing else but meer Seeming or Appearance” (1731: 3.4.2). 
In the previous section, he connects this sense of ‘appearance’ with Sextus. He then 
concludes, 
 
And therefore we can have no Certainty by Sense alone either concerning the 
Absolute Natures of Individual Corporeal things without us, nor indeed of their 
Existence; but all the Assurance that we have thereof arises from Reason and 
Intellect judging of the Phantasms or Appearances of Sense, and determining in 
which of them there is an Absolute Reality, and which of them are but meerly 
Relative or Phantastical. (1731: 3.4.8) 
 
As opposed to the passive appearances of sense,  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
12 “In vain would the skeptic make a distinction between science and common life, or between one science 
and another. The arguments employed in all, if just, are of a similar nature and contain the same force and 
evidence” (Hume 1980: 9–10). 
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Knowledge is an Inward and Active Energy of the Mind it self, and the displaying 
of its own Innate Vigour from within, whereby it doth Conquer, Master and 
Command its Objects, and so begets a Clear, Serene, Victorious, and Satisfactory 
Sense within it self. (1731: 4.1.1) 
 
Cudworth finds the origin of the distinction in Plato’s Theatetus (1731: 3.3.6). He may 
well have found some confirmation and development in Descartes’s Meditations: 
 
When I say “Nature taught me to think this,” all I mean is that a spontaneous 
impulse leads me to believe it, not that its truth has been revealed to me by some 
natural light. There is a big difference here. (AT VII 38)14 
 
Three paragraphs later Descartes distinguishes the basis of belief formed by “blind 
impulse” from that formed by “reliable judgment.” He seems to be making a point 
captured by Cudworth as follows: 
 
For Knowledge is not a Knock or Thrust from without, but it consisteth in the 
Awakening and Exciting of the Inward Active Powers of the Mind. (1731: 
3.3.5)15 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
13 I cite Cudworth (1731) by book, chapter, and section. 
14 I follow the translation in Descartes 1984. 
15 “[T]hat all our Cogitations, are Obtruded, and Imposed upon us from without; and that there is no 
Transition in our Thoughts at any time, but such as had been before in Sense; (which the Democritick 
Atheist averrs) this is a Thing, which we absolutely deny. For, had we no Mastery at all over our Thoughts, 
but they were all like Tennis Balls, Bandied, and Struck upon us, as it were by Rackets from without; then 
could we not steadily and constantly carry on any Designs and Purposes of Life” (Cudworth 1964: 845). 
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Hume (T 1.4.1), in contrast, when making this kind of distinction will be taking the side 
of the “Knock or Thrust from without.” He contended that belief in persons is like that in 
animals: an instinctual effect of observation and experience given the principles of nature 
(T 1.3.16). The argument in section 1.4.1 supports his earlier contention. His purpose in 
this section is to argue that if we reasoned as we ought to, and if belief were a cogitative 
act, we would not assent to anything. Since we do assent to some things, there must be 
some other explanation for it than reasoning as we ought to. Belief is rather an act of 
sensation—an addition of “force and vivacity”—naturally caused in us by customary 
connections observed in the past (T 1.3.7). Here is Hume’s innovation. The sensitive part 
of our nature responds to the impulse from without not only with images, but also with a 
feeling of their forcefulness. In his argument, he intends “to make the reader sensible of 
the truth of my hypothesis, that all our reasonings concerning causes and effects are 
deriv’d from nothing but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, 
than of the cogitative part of our natures” (T 1.4.1.8). 
 Think of it this way: judgment consists of a content plus assent (see Descartes, 
Meditations, AT VII 56–58). The question is, is the assent an action one does or 
something one suffers? Hume picks the latter. 
 Hume’s argument begins with the Diminution Argument that all belief depends 
on probable reasoning,16 and after every case of probable reasoning “we are oblig’d by 
our reason” to weigh in a small measure of uncertainty about whether the reasoning in 
that case was properly done. Drawing a conclusion, by weighing considerations for and 
against it, always introduces an additional consideration against it—one that ought to be 
weighed in. That is because our faculty for weighing considerations has introduced its 
                                                            
16 Even beliefs not initially arrived at by reason are subject to its scrutiny. 
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own errors in the past, independent of the original considerations themselves. The 
additional consideration needs to be weighed in. So every weighing requires a 
reweighing. Weighing in an additional consideration against a conclusion diminishes 
one’s confidence in the conclusion. So every reweighing diminishes confidence in the 
conclusion. But every reweighing is itself a weighing, so requires a further reweighing. 
So, confidence in the conclusion will be diminished to extinction during the successive 
reweighings. For Hume, like any skeptic, diminishment of confidence in a conclusion 
does not increase confidence in its negation. Nor, for Hume, is there some kind of 
negative assent, i.e., dissent, that can begin to increase; there is no negative vivacity of 
ideas. So, the result will be suspense of judgment. Hume concludes, therefore, that 
reasoning as we ought will leave us in suspense of judgment: “all the rules of logic 
require a continual diminution, and at last a total extinction of belief and evidence” (T 
1.4.1.6). 
  Don Garrett argues “that Hume offers no epistemic evaluation in concluding that 
‘all the rules of logic’ require a total extinction of belief.” Hume, rather, is merely 
explaining how our natural faculty of reason would operate if unhindered by “the 
imagination’s difficulty in following the ‘subtle and refin’d reasoning’ of such repeated 
reflections” (1997: 228). However, Hume is indeed offering an epistemic evaluation: one 
that it strikes him we should and would endorse if we were able to reason as we ought. 
The whole section, as well as the Diminution Argument itself, begins by considering how 
we ought to reason in our pursuit of truth. To minimize our chance of error, we ought to 
take our own fallibility into account when settling on the degree of assurance we should 
have in our conclusion. “In every judgment, which we can form concerning probability, 
as well as concerning knowledge, we ought always to correct the first judgment, deriv’d 
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from the nature of the object, by another judgment, deriv’d from the nature of the 
understanding” (T 1.4.1.5). Note the “ought” and the ensuing “correct.” It is an epistemic 
‘ought’ because the goal is truth and avoidance of error (T 1.4.1.1). Again, Hume 
concludes that, if we reason as we ought to in pursuit of truth, we will lose all assurance 
through our repeated corrections. 
 Many scholars think Hume’s Diminution Argument fails, but that is beside the 
point here.17 It strikes him forcefully that it succeeds. It is an “all-purpose” argument that 
can counterbalance the considerations in favor of any other view. Consequently, like the 
Pyrrhonians, Hume is unable to find anything that one ought to choose actively to 
endorse. 
 Note that the conclusion itself is one of the propositions it applies to. The 
conclusion itself is subject to diminution. So even in his own conclusion Hume has found 
nothing one ought to assent to. 
 Suppose that belief were active endorsement. We would believe just as we ought. 
So without anything we ought to assent to, there would be no belief. “If belief, therefore, 
were a simple act of the thought, without any peculiar manner of conception, or the 
addition of a force and vivacity, it must infallibly destroy itself, and in every case 
terminate in a total suspence of judgment” (T 1.4.1.8).  
 However, we cannot and do not suspend all belief as we ought to. We have lots of 
beliefs. Among other things, Hume assents to the conclusion of the Diminution 
Argument, at least during T 1.4.1 and at 1.4.7.7. Still, he says he is not able to believe it 
“sincerely and constantly,” which may mean that sometimes he does not believe it, but 
                                                            
17 For some crucial discussions of the 1.4.1 argument in addition to Garrett’s, see Morris (1989: 39–60), 
Owen (forthcoming), and Fogelin (1985: ch. 2). 
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more likely means that he is never able to act on it (T 1.4.1.7).18 In any event, we have 
beliefs, therefore belief is not an act of the cogitative part of our soul but is rather an act 
of the sensitive part. Belief is a matter of being caused to have lively ideas. It is a brute 
fact about us that, however much we might see the justice of the Diminution Argument, 
we cannot consistently follow it out for any given proposition. We quickly become 
overtaxed and almost as quickly return to belief in the convictions we were questioning. 
That is because “Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us 
to judge as well as to breathe and feel” (T 1.4.1.7). We cannot suspend all assent 
whatsoever any more than a sighted person can prevent himself from seeing his environs 
with eyes directed to them and open in the sunshine. In making the origin of all belief 
causal, Hume is echoing the Pyrrhonian view of passive assent as assent to views forced 
upon us by appearances. The “forcing” is a matter of finding ourselves to have the view 
in a way independent of the exercising of our will.19  
 One might wonder why Hume would propose the rules for causal reasoning in 
1.3.15 if he thinks we cannot reason as we ought. Why would he propose standards for 
reasoning if we cannot follow such standards? The answer is that his proposed standards 
for judging of causes and effects are ultimately practical standards, extensions of Sextus’s 
standards of action (PH I 21–24). They are how we should reason given Hume’s Title 
Principle, as Garrett has termed it: “Where reason is lively, and mixes itself with some 
                                                            
18 Cf. the belief that one ought not believe in body, where “carelessness and in-attention” prevent the 
opinion from being held constantly (T 1.4.2.56–57). 
19 Thus I agree with Morris that Hume attacks “the intellectualist model of the rationally reflective 
epistemic agent” in order to replace it with a naturalistic model (Morris 1989: 56). See also Baier (1991: 
59–61) and Owen (1999: 120–121). However, all three focus on a conception of reason as a discoverer of 
necessary connections. I take Hume to rather be arguing that an active endorser—someone who arrives at 
assent by choosing to reason as he ought—will not arrive at assent. Only assent that is a feeling caused by 
appearances can survive reasoning. Baier (1991: 96) contends in contrast that reason on Hume’s own 
account has normative authority because it can bear its own survey. Thus Hume discovers “which mental 
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propensity, it ought to be assented to.” Whence the ‘ought’? In order not to “be a loser in 
point of pleasure; and this is the origin of my philosophy” (T 1.4.7.11–12). The rules for 
causal reasoning are meant to guide our natural propensity to use induction. But they do 
not address the skeptical problem that we can find no sufficiently good reason to regard 
the results of induction as true (T 1.3.6.11). We are able to follow standards gleaned from 
natural ways of reasoning in service of practical goals. These practical standards for 
regarding some things as true or false are the “measures of truth and falshood” that Hume 
implies that we have (T 1.4.1.7). What we are unable to follow with any stable result are 
the epistemic standards we aspire to. Instead of losing all assurance, as we epistemically 
should, we retain some. As he puts it later, “After the most accurate and exact of my 
reasonings, I can give no reason why I shou’d assent to it; and feel nothing but a strong 
propensity to consider objects strongly in that view, under which they appear to me” (T 
1.4.7.3). 
 Thus in 1.4.1 Hume finds himself in the position of unavoidably believing things 
that it strikes him he wouldn’t believe if he reasoned as he ought, and so epistemically 
ought not believe. Readers of Hume who resist the Pyrrhonian interpretation crucially 
assume that no one can consistently be in such a position.20 It seems to such readers that 
assenting to a view is implicitly committing oneself to its epistemic merit.21 However, the 
distinction between the two kinds of assent is precisely intended to explain how one 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
causes are good reasons.” I agree instead with Owen (1994: 198) that 1.4.1 precisely shows that even 
Humean reason cannot bear its own survey. 
20 For instance, Garrett (2007: 7, 8, 11) assumes (i) that in providing psychological explanations, Hume has 
no reason to dispute them, (ii) that coming to believe according to the Title Principle could satisfy one’s 
curiosity only if it epistemically ought to, and (iii) that concluding that one’s own beliefs were not probable 
would undermine one’s ability to make judgments about usefulness. All these make the deep assumption 
that one can’t believe things without believing one epistemically ought to believe them.  
21 My thinking here was sparked partly by Patrick Greenough’s lecture entitled “Pragmatics in Thought: 
The Case of Moore’s Paradox,” University of Connecticut, October 2010. 
  19 
consistently can believe things that one realizes he epistemically ought not assent to, 
whether actively or passively. I’ll discuss the two possibilities in turn. 
 First, one can passively acquiesce in things for which one finds no reason 
sufficiently good for active endorsement. Passively acquiescing in views forced upon one 
by appearances just is a way to assent without regard to whether one epistemically ought 
to assent. So one violates no implicit commitment to the epistemic merit of the views in 
recognizing that one can find none. 
 Now, if one is to be such a “fool,” Hume observes, as are “all those who reason or 
believe,” he should at least be so in a way that is “natural and agreeable” as captured by 
the Title Principle (T 1.4.7.10–11).22 By acquiescing in the Title Principle, Hume decides 
for practical reasons not to try to conform to onerous epistemic requirements. He is better 
off ignoring such requirements for the sake of “service to mankind” and his “own private 
interest” (T 1.4.7.10). So, secondly, he is able to passively acquiesce in views even while 
also passively acquiescing in the view that he epistemically ought to lose all assurance 
whatsoever. The Diminution Argument with its general conclusion strikes him as 
successful, and yet he finds he cannot use that result to extinguish any given actual belief. 
He finds no practical reason why he should even make the effort. And not doing so 
violates no commitment implicit in his assent, as it would if he were actively endorsing. 
Again, active endorsement is committing oneself to following the strictures of what one 
epistemically ought to hold. It would be inconsistent to actively endorse a view when one 
thought one epistemically shouldn’t. But in passively acquiescing in views forced upon 
                                                            
22 His belief in body is another example of Hume’s believing something that he realizes he epistemically 
ought not believe. “Carelessness and in-attention” are our only way to retain any sort of assent in the vulgar 
view involving “gross illusion” and the philosophical view “loaded” with an “absurdity” (T 1.4.2.56–57). 
Even were the Title Principle an epistemic one, it could not justify the conclusion that forgetting or 
ignoring a problem is a solution to it. 
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one, one does not make such commitments. So in passively acquiescing in views despite 
passively acquiescing in the view that he shouldn’t, Hume violates no implicit 
commitment. 
 That beliefs are caused by appearances, not chosen for their merits, remains true 
even if we make theoretical investigations. We can voluntarily make observations, do 
experiments, weigh opposing considerations, etc.23 But Hume’s point is that the process 
will cause us to come to a conclusion. It will not be the occasion for our freely choosing 
which conclusion to come to. And we cannot just will away the resulting belief. Granted, 
our will could set in motion a process of further weighing of other considerations that 
could be expected to reduce our assent, or even eliminate it. But the assent itself happens 
to us, rather than is willed by us. In that way it is passive. 
 To appreciate this point, the content of the proposition assented to must be 
distinguished from the kind of assent. Theoretical content does not entail active 
endorsement. Nor does normative content. Hume can even assent to propositions of the 
form, “It is evident that …”, or “It is true that …”, or “One ought to believe that …” 
without actively endorsing them (T 1.4.7.15). His assent is wrung from him by 
appearances, by how matters strike him, and so is passive acquiescence. 
 This passive view of assent is nicely summarized, in the Treatise: 
 
We may, therefore, conclude, that belief consists merely in a certain feeling or 
sentiment; in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain 
determinate causes and principles, of which we are not masters. (T Appendix 2) 
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And also in the first Enquiry: 
 
It follows, therefore, that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some 
sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former, and which 
depends not on the will, nor can be commanded at pleasure. It must be excited by 
nature, like all other sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation, in 
which the mind is placed at any particular juncture. (EHU 5.11) 
 
Note that passive acquiescence ought not be thought of as weak assent. The assent may 
be normatively weak, but may well be causally “strong and steady” (T 1.3.7.5 n. 20). 
Hume allows, as Sextus apparently did not, that some views forced upon one by 
appearances may be causally hard to dislodge (PH I 230). Force and vivacity come in 
degrees and sometimes in a very high degree (T 1.3.13.19). 
 I’ve said that Hume is like the Pyrrhonians in finding insufficiently good reason 
for active endorsement and in yielding to passive acquiescence. But where exactly is the 
skeptic’s suspense of judgment? It might seem trivial to claim that Hume suspends active 
endorsement, when he thinks there is no such thing. Why does withholding an assent 
impossible to grant make him a skeptic? The answer is that, when he reasons as carefully 
as he can with truth as the goal, he finds no sufficiently good reason why he ought to 
believe anything. This process leads to temporary suspension of passive acquiescence, 
until his natural propensities to believe reassert themselves. But it also leads to stable 
passive acquiescence in the view that those skeptical arguments are unanswerable, even if 
they produce no lasting suspension of judgment as passive acquiescence. So were active 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
23 In this respect Hume is allowing for a Pyrrhonian way to accommodate the procedures of the New 
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endorsement possible, Hume would find it suspended. And for those who believe in 
active endorsement, they either ought to suspend it or else ought to admit with Hume that 
their assent is really nothing more than passive acquiescence, after all. 
 In summary, reasoning as we ought to would result in total suspense of judgment. 
Were there such a thing as active endorsement, we would totally suspend it, since we can 
find nothing worthy of it. Nonetheless, passive acquiescence is compelled in us by 
appearances, even appearances that result from theoretical investigation. In this way 
Hume can combine his radical skepticism with his constructive science, mathematics, and 
philosophy. He does so in a way very like the way the Pyrrhonian combined radical 
skepticism with the assent required to live a normal life. 
 It is true that Hume resists calling his skepticism Pyrrhonian, and calls it 
mitigated. But Hume erroneously took the Pyrrhonians to recommend no assent 
whatsoever, which is why he thought that a true Pyrrhonian must “remain in total 
lethargy” and soon “perish.” As we have seen, the Pyrrhonians had a ready answer to this 
charge in the distinction between two kinds of assent. They found no reason to grant 
active endorsement, but yielded to passive acquiescence in order to survive. Likewise 
Hume. There is no mitigation of his failure to find a sufficiently good reason to actively 
endorse anything; there is much natural mitigation of any great loss of passive 
acquiescence that might result from his skeptical arguments (EHU 12.23–25). Hume’s 
own one-sided view of the Pyrrhonians should not prevent our seeing him as their natural 
successor concerning assent.24 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Academy (PH I 227–229). 
24 I’m grateful to Richard Bett for penetrating comments in a symposium at the American Philosophical 
Association Central Division Meetings, 2012, as well as to Diego Machuca and Baron Reed for their 
helpful suggestions. 
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